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Abstract— Online energy disaggregation is an advanced 
technology that can help both consumers and the utility to 
implement load components analysis, enhancing the reliability 
of demand-side management. However, the online system 
requires continuous access to personal electricity data to train 
an online machine learning model, which would infer personal 
information. In this paper, we introduce a privacy-preserving 
online energy disaggregation system, the online model and 
training data can be protected by adding Gaussian noise to the 
model during the training process.  
Keywords— deep learning, smart meter, cloud computing, 
energy disaggregation, differential privacy 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The applications of advanced machine learning 
algorithms and big data technology in the power system 
enhance the efficiency and reliability of demand-side 
management (DSM).  Deep neural network (DNN) based 
technologies, such as energy disaggregation and load 
forecasting, have attracted researchers’ interest for the high 
performance in peak load shaving and valley filling [1], [2], 
[3], [4]. Moreover, with intelligent real-time sensing devices 
such as the smart meter, and the smart plug installed 
worldwide [8], it is possible for the utility to collect 
individuals’ power consumption data (active/ reactive power, 
current, voltage, and harmonics) with high sampling 
frequency. However, to train the online energy 
disaggregation system, the operator would collect a large 
amount of personal smart meter data from individuals. The 
smart meter data is highly sensitive personal data which 
would leak personal behaviours and activities inside a house 
(how many residents stay in the house, when people leave 
home, what the residents are doing at particular times, such 
as sleeping, bathing, watching TV, washing clothes, etc.). It 
is essential to present a privacy-preserving energy 
disaggregation system to protect the sensitive data and 
meanwhile provide services to consumers. 
The online energy disaggregation, or online Nonintrusive 
load monitoring (NILM), is a technique that disaggregates 
overall household power consumption into the consumption 
of individual appliances, providing detailed power usage 
information to end-users. The state-of-the-art NILM 
technique relies on deep learning algorithms (Long Short-
Term Memory Recurrent Neural Network, Convolutional 
Neural Network, et al.), providing high accuracy results to 
consumers. While many people believe the training process 
of the deep learning algorithm is a “black box” and the 
parameters inside the neural network cannot be inferred by 
others, the fact is an adversary can easily obtain the model 
parameters and simulate the training process through privacy 
inference attacks such as membership inference [5] and 
model inversion attack [6]. As a consequence, the adversary 
can further extract the details of the training data.  
Differential privacy is a mathematical definition of 
privacy, an algorithm can be treated as differential private if 
an adversary cannot distinguish whether an individual’s data 
is included/not included in a dataset by observing the output 
of the algorithm [7]. Recent works have proven differential 
privacy can be combined with a neural network to provide 
privacy-preserving services such as cloud services provided 
by Google and Amazon [8], [9]. 
In this paper, we first introduce an online energy 
disaggregation system, the system can provide efficient 
services to both demand-side managers and consumers. We 
also analyse the privacy risks of the system and develop an 
adversary that can infer personal information from the system. 
We then propose a privacy-preserving deep learning 
algorithm that satisfies (𝜀, 𝛿) differential privacy, while the 
privacy level 𝜀  quantifies the privacy leakage and can be 
adjusted to refer to the privacy requirement of the utility.  
II. RELATED WORKS 
A. Energy Disaggregation 
At the earliest stage of a DSM process, the demand-side 
manager needs to design an energy reduction/ increase plan 
of the targeted area. The plan requires the knowledge of the 
portions of load categories of each consumer at a given 
timestamp via energy disaggregation. A technology called 
nonintrusive load monitoring (NILM) is adopted by the 
companies to implement the energy disaggregation [4], [10].   
The smart meter would collect household-level data and 
upload the data to the online NILM model via a wireless 
communication network, then the model would evaluate the 
percentages of different appliances and share with the 
demand-side manager. Deep learning-based NILM would 
adopt a DNN model to implement the disaggregation, both 
long-short term memory (LSTM) and convolutional neural 
network (CNN) algorithm already reach a higher accuracy 
than conventional methods (such as Hidden Markov Model) 
[10]. 
B. Differential Privacy 
Proposed by C. Dwork in 2006, differential privacy is a 
technology to protect an individual’s identification 
information by adding random noise over the original 
aggregated data, every individual has little effect on the final 
result [7], [11], [12]. In this case, the adversary cannot 
distinguish the change of the aggregated data with/without 
one individual data. There are serval noise addition 
mechanisms available in the literature [13], including Laplace 
mechanism, Exponential mechanism, and Gaussian 
mechanism. The privacy level, 𝜀 , is guaranteed via the above 
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noise addition mechanism, and lower 𝜀  , the higher the 
privacy level can be achieved.  
Definition 1. ℜ  is a random function that transforms 
input 𝛽 to a random output  ℜ(𝛽).   
Definition 2. 𝑑(𝛽, 𝛽′), which is the distance between two 
neighboring datasets, represents the minimum number of 
individual samples required to shift dataset 𝛽 to 𝛽′. 
Definition 3. The global sensitivity, 𝑆𝑓, is the maximum 
difference between the outputs of two neighboring datasets 
𝛽 and 𝛽′ . 𝑆𝑓  also determines the overall noise to be added 
into the DP mechanism.   
𝛥𝑓 = max
𝑑(𝛽,𝛽′)=1
‖𝑓(𝛽) −𝑓(𝛽′)‖   (1) 
Definition 4. The Gaussian privacy mechanism denoted 
ℜ , is defined as f plus noise term  𝒩 . While 𝒩  is the 
Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation 
𝑆𝑓
2𝜎2.  
ℜ(𝛽) ≜ 𝑓(𝛽) + 𝒩(0, 𝛥𝑓2𝜎2)   (2) 
Definition 5. A randomized function ℜ satisfies (𝜀 , 𝛿 ) 
privacy ℙℝ for any two neighboring datasets 𝛽 and 𝛽
′: 
ℙℝ[ℜ(𝛽) ∈ 𝜉] ≤ 𝑒
𝜀ℙℝ[ℜ(𝛽
′) ∈ 𝜉] + 𝛿  (3) 
where 𝜉 denotes all possible outcomes in range ℜ, and 𝛿 is 
the possibility that the differential privacy is broken, in this 
paper, we select 10−5 as 𝛿. 
C. Deep Neural Network 
 A DNN is an artificial neural network with N multilayers, 
the larger the number of layers, the deeper computation the 
network can achieve. Given a training corpus (𝑿, 𝒀) , the 
output of the network 𝑎𝑁 is: 
𝑎𝑁(𝑥; 𝜃1,⋯,𝑁) = 𝑓𝑁(𝑓𝑁−1(⋯ 𝑓1(𝑥, 𝜃1), 𝜃𝑁−1), 𝜃𝑁) (4) 
where 𝑥 is the input of the model, 𝜃𝑛 are the parameters of the 
nth layer, 𝑓𝑛(𝑥, 𝜃)  is the linear/ nonlinear function of the 
neuron (sigmoid, tanh, SoftMax, et. al ). 
 A loss function ℒ is adopted to calculate the mismatch 
between ground truth 𝑦 and 𝑎𝑁.  The purpose of the DNN is 
to find the optimal parameters of the model 𝜃∗that minimize 
the ℒ throughout the whole training process: 
ℒ(𝜃) =
1
𝑁
∑ ℒ(𝑦, 𝑎𝑁(𝑥; 𝜃1,⋯,𝑁))(𝑥,𝑦)∈(𝑋,𝑌)   (5) 
𝜃∗ ← 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛𝜃ℒ(𝜃)    (6) 
 Since DNN has a large amount of training data and the 
topological structure is extremely complex, it is difficult to 
find the optimal solution. The stochastic gradient descent 
(SGD) is introduced to solve the problem. Instead of selecting 
all training data to train, SGD only randomly picks up a group 
of training data, which is a term called ‘batch’ B , to do 
iteration. The gradient of the batch 𝑔𝐵 is used to estimate the 
original gradient ∇𝜃ℒ(𝜃), see equation (7): 
𝑔𝐵 =
1
𝐵
∑ ∇𝜃ℒ(𝜃, 𝑥)𝑥∈𝐵     (7) 
D. Deep Learning with Differential Privacy 
To counter the above attacks,  differential privacy deep 
learning is proposed, it combines deep neural networks with 
differential privacy [8], [9] . Instead of masking the final 
result evaluated by the DNN model, differential private 
stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) mechanism adds noise 
during the whole training process, protecting all parameters 
as well as training data inside the model. The mechanism also 
introduces a sophisticated approach that can adjust the level 
of privacy 𝜀 smoothly refer to the privacy requirment. 
III. SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
In this section, we first discuss the current online energy 
disaggregation system and the vulnerability of the system. 
Based on the system, we design an adversary model that can 
infer private information from the system. 
A. Online Energy Disaggregation Model 
As an important part of the intelligent DSM system, the 
online energy disaggregation system consists of four parts 
steps (shown in Fig. 1), which are described as follows in 
detail: 
  
 1)Data Collection: Since the load components, climate, 
and electricity behaviours vary a lot in different areas, it is 
essential training the DNN model with local residential data 
rather than a public dataset. The installation of the smart 
meter enables real-time bidirectional communication 
between the utility and the consumers. Hence, the online 
database used to train the DNN is built by continuously 
collecting power consumption data from local smart meters. 
 2)Model Training: The online NILM model would 
utilize either the supervised learning algorithm [10] (both 
household-level data and appliance-level data is required for 
training, smart plugs should be installed randomly in sample 
houses to construct the appliance dataset, see [14]) or 
unsupervised learning algorithm [15] (only household-level 
data is required) to train the model. The input of the model 
would be the household-level data (active/reactive power, 
voltage, current, and potentially harmonics) and the output of 
the model would be the disaggregated power of individual 
appliances.  
 3)Query Process: The clients of the online service are 
either demand-side managers or the consumer. The services 
the model can provide include four categories: (1) Event 
detection; (2) Feature extraction; (3) Clustering; (4) Matching 
[15]. The consumer can send a query to obtain a detailed 
report about the energy consumption of appliances inside his 
house via the smart meter. The demand-side managers also 
need to have permission to access the online system, the 
managers can design an energy increase/ reduction plan 
referring to the load components information evaluated by the 
system. 
 4)DSM: With the energy plan designed in the last step, 
the demand-side manager can send DSM command to the 
local residences, this process is also called load control. Both 
direct load control and indirect load control are discussed in 
previous literature [16]. 
...
...
Consumer
Demand-side 
Manager
Database
Cloud Model
Query
Query
Result
Result
Cloud
DSM Command
TrainingUpload
Fig. 1. The Architecture of Online Energy Disaggregation System. 
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B.  Adversary Model and the Definition of ‘Privacy’ 
While the above online system can provide efficient 
services to the consumers and the utility, there is vulnerability 
related to privacy.  The adversary in this paper is strong 
enough to adopt inference attacks (membership inference 
attacks or model inversion attacks) to obtain all model 
parameters, and further infer high-sensitive information from 
the training data [17], [18]. We define ‘privacy’ as the 
information that can help the adversary identify the individual. 
In the power system, power usage data is highly related to 
human behaviour. By constantly inferring the data, the 
adversary could have an overview of the consumer’s 
behaviour inside the house.  
An adversary inference process is shown in flowchart 
Fig.2, the cloud DNN model is trained with individuals’ 
power consumption data measured by smart meters installed 
at their home.  
 
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING ONLINE ENERGY 
DISAGGREGATION SYSTEM 
Recall the original system shown in Fig. 1, the proposed 
privacy-preserving energy disaggregation system adds 
Gaussian noise to the second step — Model Training. DP-
SGD is applied to provide DP protection to the online energy 
disaggregation model. 
A. Differential Private Stochastic Gradient Descent 
Algorithm 
 We adopt the DP-SGD algorithm proposed by M. Abadi 
[8]. Considering a DNN with N training data, in each noise 
adding process, a group of L data is selected with a selection 
possibility q (q=L/N), and a batch size B from L is selected 
for every iteration. For 𝑖 ∈ T (T is the number of training 
steps): 
1) Compute Gradient: The gradient of 𝑡th training steps 
𝑔𝑡(𝑥𝑖) is computed via Equation (7); 
2) Clipping Gradient: The purpose to clip gradients is to 
reduce the sensitivity of each training data to the model 
optimizer. A threshold 𝐶 is introduced to limit the maximum 
Euclidean norm of the training data. The clipped gradient  
?̅?(𝑥𝑖) is: 
?̅?(𝑥𝑖) =
𝑔(𝑥𝑖)
max (1,‖𝑔(𝑥𝑖)‖2/𝐶)
   (8) 
3) Adding Random Noise to the Gradient: A random 
Gaussian is added to the clipped gradient, each step is (𝜀, 𝛿)-
privacy: 
?̃?(𝑥𝑖) =
1
𝐿
(∑ ?̅?(𝑥𝑖) + 𝒩(0, 𝛥𝑓
2𝜎2))𝑥∈𝐿   (9) 
Where 𝜎 =
√2𝑙𝑜𝑔1/𝛿
𝜀
. 
4) Update Parameters after each training step t: 
𝜃𝑡+1 = 𝜃𝑡 − 𝛼?̃?𝑡(𝑥𝑖)                      (10) 
B. Structure of the Model 
 We adopted a supervised DNN model as our online 
model. 60000 training data and 20000 testing data are fed to 
the DNN model. Detailed structure is shown in Table I. In the 
model, there are four fully connected layers with dropout 
layers. The function of the dropout layer is to avoid 
overfitting. As for the output layer, a SoftMax activation 
function is used to classify the state of the appliance.   
 
C. Model Hyperparameters 
The hyperparameters in the model include norm clipping, 
noise level, learning rate. In this paper, we utilize defeat 
settings in the TensorFlow Privacy library [19]. The learning 
rate 𝛼 is chosen as 0.25, the gradient norm boundary C is 
chosen as 1.5, the lot size L is chosen as 250, and we selected 
the batch size B as 50. There is already a rich literature 
illustrate the model hyperparameters selection [8] [20] [19], 
so we skip the detailed demonstration process. 
D. Benchmark and Baseline 
 Although the privacy level is adjustable depending on the 
utility requirement, there is no clear boundary between good 
and bad privacy performance. To present the simulation result 
clearly, we use the definition of “privacy levels” in [20], 
which is shown in Table II.  
 The baseline of the energy disaggregation system 
performance is shown in Table III, which is evaluated by J. 
Kelly and W. Knottenbelt [10]. They compute the accuracy 
rates of the model without DP.  
 
Neural Network 
Training
Smart Meter 
Training Data 
Trained Model
Inference 
Engine
Target 
Data
Estimation
Cloud Model
Adversary Model
 
Fig. 2. Flowchart of adversary inference process. 
TABLE I 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE ONLINE DNN MODEL 
 
Layer Activation 
Function 
Output Shape Parameters 
Fully connected RELU (1, 256) 512 
Dropout — (1,256) 0 
Fully connected RELU (1,512) 131584 
Dropout — (1,512) 0 
Fully connected RELU (1,1024) 525312 
Dropout — (1,1024) 0 
Fully connected SoftMax (1,3) 3075 
 
TABLE II 
BENCHMARK OF DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY LEVEL [20] 
 
Privacy Level 𝜺 
Poor ≥ 3 
Fine 1~3 
Good ≤ 1 
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V. IMPLEMENTATION 
A. Dataset 
In this paper, we use “The Reference Energy 
Disaggregation Data Set (REDD)” [21]. REDD contains 6 
houses and 20 appliances with an interval resolution of 3s. 
REDD is a desirable dataset for simulation for its high 
sampling frequency and low noise rate. 
B. Hardware and Software 
The simulation and computation are implemented on a 
Dell laptop equipped with Core i7-7700HQ CPU and 8GB 
RAM. The deep learning algorithm was run on Python 3.6, 
the Tensorflow framework is adopted to train the DNN model, 
and the Tensorflow Privacy library [19] is adopted to enable 
implementation of DP on DNN.  
C. Dataset Pre-processing 
The original appliance data is the power consumption of 
appliances in kW, we transfer the power into the state 
information. There are two advantages to implement the 
transformation: (1) this method reduces the computation 
volume of the cloud computer; (2) the transformed curve is 
more flatten compared to the original power consumption 
curve, see Fig. 3. It can hide more detailed characteristic 
information which would reveal private information. As 
shown in Table III, although most appliances only have two 
states, which are “ON” and “OFF”, an appliance may have 
multi states, such as the dishwasher. So, the function of the 
DNN model turns to a classification problem, to identify the 
current state of the target appliance. After obtaining the state 
database, we further transfer the data to one-hot encoded data, 
which is widely adopted in classification tasks. 
 
 
VI. SIMULATION AND RESULT 
In this section, we implement case studies to verify the 
capability of the privacy-preserving energy disaggregation 
system. As described in Table IV,  three appliances, 
microwave oven, dishwasher, and fridge are adopted in this 
section. We adjust the privacy level 𝜀 gradually and observe 
how 𝜀   influences the performance of the online system. 
Figure 4 shows the performance of the online DNN model 
with different ε. The blue curve represents the ground truth, 
while the orange shallow represents the result evaluated by 
the model. It is observed that with the decrease of 𝜀 , the 
performance gets worse. 
The privacy-accuracy curve is shown in Fig. 5, while the 
online system with differential privacy can reach an average 
accuracy of 85%, the system with differential privacy has 
worse performance. Although the larger noise added to the 
DNN contributes to a better privacy performance, it sacrifices 
accuracy at the same time. Hence, a good privacy level should 
have a trade-off between utility and privacy. From the figure, 
a 𝜀 between 1 and 3 is desirable.  
VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
In this paper, we develop a privacy-preserving online 
energy disaggregation system to deal with the privacy issues 
raised by cloud computing and online DNN. We first 
introduce the online energy disaggregation system and 
highlight the functionalities it brings to both the utility and 
consumers, especially in DSM. A DP-SGD algorithm is 
applied to the training process of the online model, we add 
random Gaussian noise to the gradient of every training step, 
satisfy (𝜀 , 𝛿)-differential privacy. We also implement case 
studies via public power consumption dataset REDD, from 
the result of the simulation, it is found that with the privacy 
level 𝜀 reduces (noise level increases), the accuracy rate of 
the online system decreased gradually. Once the privacy level 
is quantified, the utility can provide multi-level privacy 
protection refers to consumers’ requirements. 
 
TABLE III 
THE ACCURACY OF DNN-BASED ENERGY DISAGGREGATION MODEL 
WITHOUT DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY [10] 
 
Appliance Accuracy(%) 
Microwave 98 
Fridge 81 
Dish Washer 70 
Average 83 
 
TABLE IV  
THE POWER AND STATES OF APPLIANCES [10] [15] 
 
Appliance States  Power Each State 
(Watts) 
Microwave  2 S1: 0 
S2: 500 
S3: 1500 
Fridge 2 S1: 0 
S2:100 
Dishwasher 3 S1: 0 
S2:100 
S3:1500 
 
    
 
 
    
        
Fig. 3. The curve of original (upper) and transformed (lower) appliance-
level data (Dishwasher as example). 
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(a) 𝜀 = 2.3 
 
(b) 𝜀 = 0.01 
 
Fig. 4. Performance of the online system with different 𝜀 (Fridge as 
example). 
 
Fig. 5. Privacy-Accuracy Curve (Average value of appliances). 
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